文章來源：https://bit.ly/35Bysww
翻譯：PTT dennis99
作者是美國威爾遜研究中心的研究員Kamil Galeev所發表的推文
昨天他在推特上發表一篇關於「俄羅斯為何將輸掉這場戰役」的文章， 他不但從許多俄國歷史文化的角度分析兩國之間的關係， 也從近年俄、烏雙方的建軍歷程說明俄、烏兩軍的表現為何如此「出人意料」。 因為這邊是軍事版，所以我就略過歷史的部分，摘要近年俄、烏建軍歷程的相關段落， ，且因時間有限，我直接使用推特的翻譯功能，提供中文對照， 頂多太怪的會順手修一下，如果版友們有任何翻譯建議，也請在推文提供。 如需要看完整文章，請至他個人推特瀏覽。
一、俄國近年的建軍問題：
Consider a timely paper on Russian army by Bismarck Analysis. It’s good &
informative. It’s correct on its land-based and artillery-centric character.
It’s also correct that Minister of Defence Serdyukov greatly increased army’sefficiency in 2007-2012. But it’s still misleading.
考慮一下俾斯麥分析關於俄羅斯軍隊的即時論文。這很好，內容豐富。它的陸基和以火砲為中心的特徵是正確的。同樣正確的是，國防部長謝爾久科夫在 2007-2012 年大大提高了軍隊的效率。但這仍然具有誤導性。
(下圖為他所說的分析論文)
https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1497994067019452422/photo/1
Yes, Minister Serdyukov indeed reformed the army. He increased its
efficiency, fought with corrupt and crony armament producers improving thearmy supplies. As a result he became extremely unpopular, made tons of
powerful enemies and was ousted in 2012 losing his power and status.
是的，謝爾久科夫部長確實改革了軍隊。他提高了它的效率，與腐敗和裙帶關係的軍備生產商進行了鬥爭，改善了軍隊的供應。結果，他變得非常不受歡迎，結下了無數強大的敵人，並於 2012 年被趕下台，失去了權力和地位。
His successor Shoygu knew better than that. Now who’s Shoygu? Shoygu is the*only* single Russian minister who uninterruptedly worked in government since1991, since the very beginning of Russian Federation. He worked for allpresidents, all prime ministers avoided all purges.
他的繼任者Shoygu這更清楚。誰是Shoygu？自 1991 年以來，Shoygu是*唯一的*持續在任的俄羅斯部長，自俄羅斯聯邦成立之初就不間斷地在政府工作。他為所有總統工作，所有總理都避免了所有清洗.
What does it mean? It means he’s a cunning political entrepreneur, great in
court politics, publicity, image. You survive every single administration by
maxing your political survival. And to max it you need to minimise animosity.
So you never object to powerful interest groups.
這是什麼意思？這意味著他是一個狡猾的政治企業家，擅長宮廷政治、宣傳、形象。你通過最大化你的政治生存來生存每一屆政府。為了最大化它，你需要最小化敵意。所以你永遠不會反對強大的利益集團.
Serdyukov fought with interest groups and was destroyed. Shoygu was smarterthan that. He launched a PR campaign presenting himself as the “saviour” from the Serdyukov’s legacy. Whatever his predecessor did, was dismantled. Media cheered, people cheered, interest groups cheered.
謝爾久科夫與利益集團作戰並被摧毀。 Shoygu比那更聰明。他發起了一場公關活動，將自己展示為謝爾久科夫遺產的“救世主”。無論他的前任做什麼，都被拆除了。媒體歡呼，民眾歡呼，利益集團歡呼.
That’s a very, very typical problem. Efficiency-maxing requires ruthlessness in dealing with established elites and interest groups. Meanwhile, court-politics-maxing requires pondering to them and not making enemies. Serdyukov was maxing efficiency, Shoygu – court politics.
這是一個非常非常典型的問題。效率最大化需要在與老牌精英和利益集團打交道時冷酷無情。同時，法庭政治最大化需要仔細考慮他們而不是樹敵。謝爾久科夫正在最大限度地提高效率，Shouygu- 宮廷政治。
There was another issue. Shoygu is ethnic Tuvan. In such a country as Russia minority member can hardly become the supreme leader. People don’t perceive him as ethnic Russian (see his palace) which means he’s not dangerous for the leader and you can safely delegate him the army.
還有另一個問題。 Shoygu是圖瓦人。在俄羅斯這樣的國家，少數族裔很難成為最高領導人。人們不認為他是俄羅斯人（見他的宮殿），這意味著他對領導人沒有危險，你可以放心地將軍隊委任給他。
Shoygy not only purged Serdyukov’s appointees, pondered to old military
establishment, stopped arguing with army suppliers about the equipment cost and quality. He also pondered to numerous feel-good-lies regarding the Russian big strategy. Let’s consider the army vs navy problem.
Shoygy 不僅清洗了謝爾久科夫的任命人員，還重新考慮了舊的軍事機構，不再與軍隊供應商就裝備成本和品質爭論不休。他還琢磨了許多關於俄羅斯大戰略的自我感覺良好的謊言。讓我們考慮陸軍與海軍的問題。
Army vs navy had been a traditional dilemma of European powers for centuries.As a rule, you couldn’t support both first class army and first class navy,you had to choose. Some powers ignored this to their demise – like 17-18th cc France. Others were more rational, like Prussia.
幾個世紀以來，陸軍與海軍一直是歐洲大國的傳統困境。通常，你不能同時支持一流的陸軍和一流的海軍，你必須做出選擇。一些大國無視這一點而走向滅亡——比如 17-18 cc France。其他人更理性，比如普魯士。
(以下回顧17世紀布蘭登堡到18世紀普魯士建軍的政策，我就先省略，共2段)
So. Land-maxing requires minimising the naval ambition. Does Russia minimise its naval ambition? No. It feels obliged to maintain as much Soviet naval legacy as possible. Keep old ships afloat, build new ones, maintain and
expand infrastructure for the ocean navy
所以。土地最大化需要最小化海軍野心。俄羅斯是否將其海軍野心最小化？不，感覺有義 務盡可能多地保留蘇聯海軍遺產。保持舊船漂浮，建造新船，維護和擴大海洋海軍的基礎 設施。
Here is another dilemma. Regional fleets can be effectively used in land
wars. For example, Russia declared “navy manoeuvres” and then attacked
Ukraine from the sea. That’s cheap and effective. But keeping a regional
fleet doesn’t sound sexy. It’s efficiency-maxing, not PR-maxing。
這是另一個困境。區域艦隊可以有效地用於陸戰。例如，俄羅斯宣布“海軍演習”，然後從海上襲擊烏克蘭。這既便宜又有效。但保持一支區域艦隊聽起來並不性感。這是效率最大化，而不是公關 (PR)最大化。(*這裡PR的意思感謝abc12812版友提供翻譯協助)
And Russia is PR-maxing. Putin declared that the share of new ships should
reach 70% by 2027. Old Soviet ships are becoming obsolete, Russia’s building new ones. BUT. Major Soviet shipyards are located in Ukraine. So now Russia expands shipyard infrastructure to reach this goal.
俄羅斯正在進行公關最大化。普京宣布，到2027年，新艦船的佔比應達到70%。蘇聯的舊艦船正在 變得過時，俄羅斯正在建造新艦船。但。蘇聯的主要造船廠位於烏克蘭。所以現在俄羅斯 擴大了造船廠基礎設施以實現這一目標。
Soviet naval legacy is a curse of Russian military. USSR could afford ocean
fleets with carrier strike group. Russia can’t. But abandoning Soviet
ambitions would require suppressing their own hubris (impossible). So they
strive to maintain it. Ergo: they can’t and won’t land-max。
蘇聯海軍遺產是俄羅斯軍隊的詛咒。蘇聯可以負擔擁有航母打擊群的遠洋艦隊。俄羅斯不 行。但是放棄蘇聯的野心需要壓制他們自己的狂妄自大（不可能）。所以他們努力維護它。Ergo：他們不能也不會最大限度地擴展陸權。*
(land-max，這詞感謝版友rt3648yth翻譯協助)。
How does it reflect on this war? First, Russian invading force is small. It
has LOTS of artillery ofc. But it’s not numerous enough to win. Pro-Russian
analysts compare their advance with Barbarossa. But unlike Wehrmacht in 1941 Russian invaders have only *ONE ECHELON OF TROUPS*。
它如何反映這場戰爭？一是俄軍入侵力量小。它有很多火砲。但它的數量不足以贏得勝利。親俄分析師將他們的進步與巴巴羅薩進行了比較。但與 1941 年的國防軍不同，俄羅斯入侵者只有*一個梯隊*。
How is a Blitzkrieg organised? By echelons. First echelon is moving forward
as fast as they can. Ofc this means that lots of defenders will be left in
their rear. But then the second echelon comes, then third, etc. They finish
defenders, occupy territory, control the supply lines。
閃電戰是如何組織的？按梯隊。第一梯隊正在以最快的速度前進。當然這意味著許多後衛將留在他們的後方。但是隨後第二梯隊來了，然後是第三梯隊，依此類推。他們終結了守軍，佔領了領土，控制了補給線。
If Russia launched a proper Barbarossa-style Blitzkrieg that would happen now- first, second, third echelons. But the second echelon didn’t come. It never existed. Why? First, Russia’s *not* landmaxing and thus doesn’t have so much resources and infrastructure for the land war.
如果俄羅斯發動一場適當的巴巴羅薩式閃電戰，現在就會發生——第一梯隊、第二梯隊、第三梯隊。但是第二梯隊沒有來。它從未存在過。為什麼？首先，俄羅斯*不是*陸軍最大化，因此沒有那麼多資源和基礎設施用於陸戰。
Secondly, launching several echelons would require long arduous preparation. You need to mobilise them, move to the borders, quarter, maintain and supply. It’s not that easy. It’s a hard job that should have been done well in advance to wage a Blitzkrieg. And it hadn’t been done.
其次，發射幾個梯隊需要長期艱苦的準備。你需要動員他們，轉移到邊境，駐紮，維護和供應。沒有那麼容易。這是一項艱鉅的工作，應該提前做好以發動閃電戰。而且還沒有完成。
Why Russia didn’t prepare a proper Blitzkrieg? And now we come for the third and main reason. Blitzkrieg is a war strategy. Blitzkrieg is how you break & suppress the enemy who’s actually fighting. Russia didn’t plan it because it didn’t plan a war. It planned a Special Operation.
為什麼俄羅斯沒有準備適當的閃電戰？現在我們來是為了第三個也是主要原因。閃電戰是一種戰爭策略。閃電戰是你如何打破和壓制實際戰鬥的敵人。俄羅斯沒有計劃，因為它沒有計劃戰爭。它計劃了一次特別行動。
Ofc partially that’s just modern discourse. After WWII traditional
understanding of sovereignty as of legal right of sovereign rulers to wage
offensive war died. As a result modern states never admit they’re waging
wars. They’re waging “pacifications”, “counterterrorism”, etc.
當然部分只是現代話語。二戰後，將主權視為主權統治者發動進攻性戰爭的合法權利的傳統理解消失了。因此，現代國家從不承認他們正在發動戰爭。他們在進行“安撫”、“反恐”等。
Consider how all the War Departments and Ministries over the world were
renamed into “Defence” in late 1940s. Everyone’s defending, nobody’s
attacking. Why does the fighting happen then? Well, because of criminals –
“bandits”, “terrorists”, “jihadees” or as now in Ukraine “Nazis”.
想想在 1940 年代後期，世界上所有的戰爭部和部委是如何更名為“國防”的。每個人都在防守，沒有人在進攻。那為什麼會發生戰鬥呢？好吧，因為犯罪分子-“土匪”，“恐怖分子”，“聖戰者”或現在在烏克蘭的“納粹”。
Modern world abolished the distinction between the enemy and the criminal, a key idea of the Roman Law. Powers do wage wars, but to do so they need to criminalise and dehumanise their enemies. Hence, all the “terrorist” discourse. In a sense Putin is going with the flow。
現代世界廢除了敵人和罪犯之間的區別，這是羅馬法的一個關鍵思想。大國確實發動戰爭，但要這樣做，他們需要將他們的敵人定為犯罪和非人化。因此，所有的“恐怖主義”言論。從某種意義上說，普京只是跟隨了時代的潮流。
But on a deeper level Putin is absolutely correct. His declaration of
“special operation” in Ukraine is sincere, because he didn’t expect the war.
He doesn’t know how to do wars. For all of his life he’s been organising and
launching the special operations。
但在更深層次上，普京是絕對正確的。他在烏克蘭宣布“特別行動”是真誠的，因為他沒想到會發生戰爭。他不知道如何進行戰爭。他一生都在組織和發起特別行動。
First, as a KGB officer. Then, as St Petersburg city councillor for foreign
affairs (= illegally selling Soviet warehouse stuff to the West). In 1990s he
closely worked with the criminal world and he did it successfully. Here you
see him with a thief-in-law, Grandpa Hassan。
首先，作為KGB官員。然後，作為聖彼得堡市外交事務議員(=非法向西方出售蘇聯倉庫的東西）。 1990 年代，他與犯罪界密切合作，並取得了成功。在這裡你看到他和一個小偷哈桑爺爺。
Btw that’s how Putin’s pal Grandpa Hassan is celebrating with his close
circle. It gives some idea of Putin’s business partners and associates.
順便說一句，下面影片就是普京的朋友哈桑爺爺與他的親密圈子慶祝的方式。
它讓我們了解了普京的商業夥伴和同事。
影片網址：
Putin worked with violent entrepreneurs used to killing. But. He had always
had the upper hand. Federal and regional governments were very much stronger than these criminal bosses who were very much replaceable. Everyone of them had dozens of henchmen who wanted to take his place.
普京與習慣於殺戮的暴力企業家一起工作。但。他總是佔上風。聯邦和地區政府比這些非常容易被替換的犯罪頭目要強大得多。他們每個人都有幾十個心腹想要取代他的位置。
Putin waged special operations when he had much stronger position than these criminals. And he got used to that. Later Yeltsin chose him as a successor and in this capacity Putin launched a bunch of special operations to consolidate power. Again with full support of higher ups.
普京在地位比這些罪犯強得多的時候發動了特別行動。他已經習慣了。後來葉利欽選擇了他作為接班人，普京以此身份發動了一系列鞏固權力的特別行動。再次得到上級的全力支持。
Yeah, Putin played badass even before becoming a President. But it was easy
to play a badass when he was backed up by then President and the entire
apparatus of Kremlin. Huge power, no risk, no accountability.
是的，普京甚至在成為總統之前就表現得很糟糕。但是當他得到當時的總統和克里姆林宮整個機構的支持時，他很容易扮演壞蛋。巨大的權力，沒有風險，沒有責任。
Later he initiated conflicts each time his had to boost his popularity and
tough image. Chechnya, Georgia, Syria. But neither of this was a war. Every
conflict was a Special operation waged:
1) for political goals
2) against small force which had no chance to win against Russia
後來，每次為了提升知名度和強硬形象，他都會引發矛盾。車臣，喬治亞，敘利亞。但這兩者都不是戰爭。每一次沖突都是一場特別行動：
1) 政治目標
2) 對付沒有機會戰勝俄羅斯的小部隊
Putin fought only with small countries. Chechnya – 1 million people, Georgia- 4. Syria had more, but he fought with rebels, with no proper training or armaments. Also “counterterrorist” discourse allowed Russians to simply level entire cities to the ground with no consequences。
普京只與小國作戰。車臣 – 100 萬人，喬治亞 – 400萬人。敘利亞有更多，但他是與叛軍作戰，而叛軍沒有適當的訓練或武器。此外，“反恐”言論允許俄羅斯人簡單地將整個城市夷為平地而沒有任何戰後責任。
Every time Putin needed to confirm his alpha status he would devastate some little country with a Special Operation. They didn’t require proper
preparation because they bore no existential risk to Russia or to him. Like, the fuck they’re gonna do? No risk = no need to bother.
每次普京需要確認他的領袖地位時，他都會通過特別行動摧毀一些小國家。他們不需
要適當的準備，因為他們對俄羅斯或他沒有生存風險。就像，他們他媽的要做什麼？沒有風險=無需費心。
Putin decided to repeat this little trick again. Hence, not that numerous
army of invasion, only one echelon of advance, etc. But Ukraine is much
bigger – it has 44 million people. What was Putin thinking? Apparently he was expecting zero resistance from the Ukrainian army.
普京決定再次重複這個小技巧。因此，沒有那麼多入侵的軍隊，只有一個梯隊的推進，等 等。但烏克蘭要大得多——它有 4400 萬人。普京在想什麼？顯然他期待烏克蘭軍隊的零抵抗。
Putin had a good reason to believe so. Indeed, in 2014 Russian regulars (”
их там нет” = “there aren’t any of them there”) easily destroyed
Ukrainian forces in Debaltsevo and Ilovaysk. He saw that Ukrainian army is
weak and he can easily route them simply sending .
普京有充分的理由相信這一點。事實上，在 2014 年，俄羅斯的「小綠人(民兵」
（“их там нет”=“他們不是任何一個當地的「他們」”）輕鬆摧毀了德巴爾
採沃和伊洛韋斯克的烏克蘭軍隊。他看到烏克蘭軍隊很弱，他只需派遣俄羅斯正規軍就可以輕鬆擊潰他們。
**感謝speedwave及neutrino版友建議，暫譯如上**
另外感謝KleinSchwarz版友的說明：
KleinSchwarz: ихтамнеты 其實是俄文 их там нет 構成的新詞。根據俄文維基的解釋，這個詞是俄國侵占克里米亞時，普丁在節目上被問到克里米亞到底有沒有俄軍時所用的回答。их там нет的意思是「那裡沒有他們（俄軍）」，後來就成為俄軍的一種能指，也是十分有趣
Strategically speaking Putin fucked up. He defeated Ukraine, inflicted pain
and humiliation. Anyone with an IQ above the room temperature knew the war is not over and Russians would strike again. But – Putin didn’t finish Ukraine back then. He thought he’d always have a chance.
從戰略上講，普京搞砸了。他打敗了烏克蘭，造成了痛苦和屈辱。任何智商高於室溫的人都知道戰爭還沒有結束，俄羅斯人會再次發動襲擊。但是 – 普京當時並沒有終結烏克蘭。他以為他永遠有機會。
What happened next was quite predictable. Inflicting a painful but not
critical defeat on your enemy is risky. Yeah, they kinda became weaker. But
the balance of power within them changed. Court politics maxing interest
groups lost and efficiency maxing upstarts get a chance.
接下來發生的事情完全可以預料。對你的敵人造成痛苦但不嚴重的失敗是有風險的。是的，他們變弱了。但他們的內部權力平衡發生變化：宮廷政治使利益團體失勢，而效率掛帥的新勢力抓住了機會。
烏克蘭的部分：
Nothing motivates as hard as an existential threat. First, Ukrainians
admitted the truth:
“I’ll be frank. Today we have no army. Now we can assemble a group of 5
thousand capable soldiers max [out of 125 on paper]”
– reported minister of defence in 2014
沒有什麼比生存威脅更能激發人的動力了。首先，烏克蘭人承認了事實：
“坦率地說。今天我們沒有軍隊。
現在我們最多可以集結5000名有能力的士兵[雖然帳面有12.5萬人]”
2014 年烏克蘭國防部長的報告
In 2014 Ukrainian equipment was awful. Almost 100% vehicle and ammunition were 25+ year old Soviet stocks. Moreover, most of it just expired. Like vehicles existed on paper but were never checked or used since 1991. Their radiators, accumulators all rotten and unrepairable.
2014 年，烏克蘭的設備很糟糕。幾乎 100% 的車輛和彈藥都是 25 年以上的蘇聯庫存。而且，大部分剛剛過期。就像帳面上雖然有車輛，但自 1991 年以來從未檢查或使用過。它們的散熱器、蓄電池都已腐爛且無法修復。
FSB colonel who led pro-Russian insurgency in 2014 admitted it created
problem for him, too. He wanted to restock from the Ukrainian military
warehouses, but that stuff just didn’t work. Like they took 28 anti-tank
missiles and fired them all during Nikolaevka battle. None worked。
2014 年領導親俄叛亂的 FSB 上校承認，這也給他帶來了麻煩。他想從烏克蘭的軍事倉庫補貨，但那東西沒用。就像他們在尼古拉耶夫卡戰役中拿走了 28 枚反坦克導彈並全部發射了一樣。沒有一發有效。
Judging by the interviews with insurgents who were disappointed to find that rockets, shells, grenades taken from Ukrainian warehouses were 99%
dysfunctional (ofc, they were 25+ years old) it’s not surprising Ukraine lost
to Russia in 2014. It’s surprising they could fight at all.
從對叛亂分子的採訪來看，他們失望地發現從烏克蘭倉庫中取出的火箭、砲彈、手榴彈99% 都無法正常工作（當然，它們製造日期都超過 25年了），烏克蘭在 2014 年輸給俄羅斯也就不足為奇了。他們能戰鬥才奇怪！
(譯註：這句原本機翻有點突兀，感謝版友NewCop的協助)
Even the ancient soviet radio machines didn’t work. Ukrainian soldiers had to communicate with SMS and since network was often awful they had to throw their mobile phones up in air in a hope may be it will catch radio signal few meters over the ground.
即使是古老的蘇聯無線電機器也無法工作。烏克蘭士兵不得不通過簡訊進行通信，由於網路通常很糟糕，他們不得不把手機扔到空中，希望它能捕捉到離地面幾米遠的無線電信號。
That’s how Ukrainian army looked back then. No wonder it was immediately crushed by Russian regulars in Debaltsevo and Ilovaysk and Putin had every reason to believe that resistance will be broken the moment he launches his regular army en masse.
那時的烏克蘭軍隊就是這樣看的。難怪它立即在傑巴爾採沃和伊洛韋斯克被俄羅斯正規軍鎮壓，普京完全有理由相信，一旦他大規模發動正規軍，抵抗就會被打破。
A lot has changed. First, Ukraine has had six drafts. Men were drafted and
sent to Donbass. Then most demobilised and returned to civilian life. This
Donbass contingent was around 60 thousand soldiers and constantly rotated. So now Ukraine has 400 000+ veterans of Donbass war.
很多東西都變了。首先，烏克蘭已徵兵六次。男子被徵召並送往頓巴斯。然後大多數復員並返回平民生活。這支頓巴斯特遣隊約有六萬士兵，不斷輪換。所以現在烏克蘭有400000多名頓巴斯戰爭退伍軍人。
Many of them were in combat. Thus Ukraine has huge number of veterans with combat experience. Probably more than Russia. Yes, Russia has been fighting in Syria. It never published the size of its force but it’s estimated to be 2-3 thousand. Most Russian soldiers have not seen war.
他們中的許多人都在戰鬥。因此，烏克蘭擁有大量具有戰鬥經驗的退伍軍人。可能超過俄羅斯。是的，俄羅斯一直在敘利亞作戰。它從未公佈其部隊的規模，但估計為 2-3 千人。大多數俄羅斯士兵沒有看過戰爭。
Furthermore, combat they’ve seen is different. Russian soldiers are used to
fighting only when they total superiority. In Syria they would just level
cities to the ground with bombers. Meanwhile, Ukrainian soldiers have fought only against far stronger and better equipped enemy.
而且，他們所見的戰鬥也不一樣。俄羅斯士兵只有在完全佔據優勢時才習慣戰鬥。在敘利亞，他們只會用轟炸機將城市夷為平地。與此同時，烏克蘭士兵只與更強大、裝備更精良的敵人作戰。
Equipment-wise this war took Ukrainian army half-resupplied. It developed many innovative weaponry of its own, but almost none of it was produced on large scale. In most cases soldiers have only few prototypes of new, Ukrainian-produced weaponry。
裝備方面，這場戰爭使烏克蘭軍隊得到了一半的補給。它自己開發了許多創新武器，但幾乎沒有一個是大規模生產的。在大多數情況下，士兵只有少數烏克蘭生產的新型武器原型。
Ukraine ordered 48 Turkish Bayraktars TB2 drones. That’s not bad – more than twice what Azerbaijan had in Karabakh. But only 12 of them got to the troops by now. Ukraine is also developing new, stronger drone Bayraktar Akinci together with Turks, but it’s too late for this war。
克蘭訂購了 48 架土耳其 Bayraktars TB2 無人機。這還不錯——是阿塞拜疆在卡拉巴赫的兩倍多。但現在只有12架無人機到了部隊。烏克蘭也在與土耳其人一起開發新的、更強大的無人機 Bayraktar Akinci，但這場戰爭為時已晚。
However, Ukrainians got a number (unpublished) of American-produced Javelins and M141 Bunker Defeat Munition, & British-Swedish produced MBT LAWs. Together with Ukrainian produced anti-tank weaponry such as “Stugna-P”, RK-3 “Corsar” and “Barrier” it helps to fight Russian tanks.
然而，烏克蘭人獲得了一些（未公佈的）美國生產的標槍和 M141 掩體擊破彈藥，以及英國-瑞典生產的 MBT LAW。連同烏克蘭生產的反坦克武器，如”Stugna-P”, RK-3″Corsar” 和 “Barrier”。它有助於對抗俄羅斯坦克。
Ukrainian troops hadn’t received many new tanks by the time Putin attacked. But they got new armoured vehicles, such as domestic-produced Cossack-2 with Turkish produced Aselsan fighting modules and a number of American armoured vehicles, humvees, etc.
到普京發動襲擊時，烏克蘭軍隊還沒有收到很多新坦克。但是他們得到了新的裝甲車，例如國產的哥薩克2和土耳其生產的阿塞爾桑戰鬥模塊和一些美國裝甲車、悍馬等。
Finally, Ukraine created a new type of troops – the troops of territorial
defence, whose number is estimated in 60 000. It’s a copy of the Polish troop type. These are civilians who get military training and can be mobilised in a day to fight only in their own town and region.
最後，烏克蘭創建了一種新型部隊——領土防禦部隊，其人數估計為 60 000 人。這是波蘭部隊類型的複製品。這些是受過軍事訓練的平民，可以在一天內動員起來，只在自己的城鎮和地區進行戰鬥。
Why? Well, that’s pretty obvious. If Russia made a proper Blitzkrieg with
several echelons of attack, Ukraine would lose anyway. But Russia didn’t. And Ukrainians bet that they wouldn’t. First – it’s costly and difficult for a
state security regime which isn’t landmaxing。
為什麼？嗯，這很明顯。如果俄羅斯進行了一次適當的閃電戰，有幾個梯隊的攻擊，烏克蘭無論如何都會輸。但俄羅斯沒有。烏克蘭人打賭他們不會。首先——對於一個沒有土地最大化的國家安全制度來說，這是昂貴和困難的。
Second, Putin expected Ukrainian army to run away or surrender in the first
day. Like most of foreign observers expected. Now they’re of course changing the narrative, but if you look at their posts few days ago they didn’t believe that Ukrainians would make any real resistance.
其次，普京預計烏克蘭軍隊在第一天就逃跑或投降。正如大多數外國觀察家所預料的那樣。現在他們當然在改變敘述，但如果你看他們幾天前的帖子，他們不相信烏克蘭人會做出任何真正的抵抗。
So Putin attacked with only one echelon. Troops pushed forward leaving many non-destroyed Ukrainian regulars and levy behind. In a proper Blitzkrieg a second and third echelon would have come to finish Ukrainian defenders. But they didn’t. These additional echelons didn’t exist.
所以普京只用了一個梯隊進攻。部隊向前推進，留下許多未被摧毀的烏克蘭正規軍和徵兵。在適當的閃電戰中，第二梯隊和第三梯隊將掃蕩烏克蘭防衛軍。但他們沒有。這些額外的梯隊並不存在。
Which immediately created the supply and replenishment problem. The first echelon pushed forward. It needs a supply in ammo, in fuel and well, in
people. But these supply convoys are being attacked by the regulars and
territorial defence troops left behind.
這立即造成了供應和補貨問題。第一梯隊向前推進。它需要彈藥、燃料和人員的供應。但這些補給車隊正遭到留下的正規軍和領土防禦部隊的襲擊。
And reportedly by the levy whom the government just distributed guns. These people would be unable to stand against the Russian columns but they can attack convoys. Consider that Ukraine has many veterans with combat experience among civilians.
據報導，政府剛剛分發槍支的徵稅人。這些人將無法抵抗俄羅斯的縱隊，但他們可以攻擊車隊。考慮到烏克蘭有許多平民中具有戰鬥經驗的退伍軍人。
Strelkov, who led pro-Russian insurgency in 2014 confirms this version in his telegram. Supply columns are being destroyed because there’s no second echelon.
2014 年領導親俄叛亂的 Strelkov 在他的電報中證實了這一說法。補給線被摧毀，因為沒有第二梯隊。
Putin is apparently concerned. In the video of 25 Feb he called for Ukrainian
military to do a coup d’erat. He wouldn’t need it if his plan worked in the
first place.
普京顯然很擔心。在 2 月 25 日的影片中，他呼籲烏克蘭軍方發動政變。如果他的計劃奏效，一開始他就不需要它。
What does it mean? Putin’s plan didn’t work. Cuz he didn’t plan for war. He
never fought a war and has no idea how to fight them. He has been always
doing Special Operations and this is a Special Operation, too. They should
have just run away or surrender, but they keep fighting.
這是什麼意思？普京的計劃沒有奏效。因為他沒有計劃戰爭。他從未打過仗，也不知道如何與他們作戰。他一直在做特別行動，這也是特別行動。他們本應該逃跑或投降，但他們一直在戰鬥。
The defeat in this operation will inflict enormous consequences for Putin and his regime. They are unlikely to survive this defeat. Meanwhile, it’s
unlikely that Putin wins by the same methods.
這次行動的失敗將對普京及其政權造成巨大後果。他們不太可能在這次失敗中倖存下來。與此同時，普京不太可能以同樣的方式獲勝。
It’s not that Russian morale is low, it’s rather that it depends on how hard
the war is.Most Russian troops would be enthusiastic or wouldn’t mind against a small foreign vacation with fun and adventures. Fighting a hard long war with real possibility of death is another matter.
並不是說俄羅斯士氣低落，而是取決於戰爭的艱難程度。大多數俄羅斯軍隊會熱情或不介意在國外度過一個有趣和冒險的小假期。打一場真正有可能死亡的艱苦長期戰爭是另一回事。
Morale of Russian troops is widely overestimated. According to sociological
studies the main motivation to enlist is usually to get an apartment. They
are usually young men from underprivileged background with no real prospects in life. That’s a chance to get a housing from state.
俄羅斯軍隊的士氣被普遍高估了。根據社會學研究，入伍的主要動機通常是為了獲得公寓。他們通常是來自貧困背景的年輕人，沒有真正的生活前景。這是從政府獲得住房的機會。
Now if you are dead, you can’t get a housing. Perhaps those already in
Ukraine have little choice but the very fact that resistance continues, war
is bloody and casualties are real would hugely demotivate those back at home. Expect no enthusiasm to go there on Russian side.
現在，如果你死了，你將無法獲得住房。也許那些已經在烏克蘭的人別無選擇，但抵抗仍在繼續，戰爭是血腥的，傷亡是真實的這一事實將極大地打擊那些回到家鄉的人。因此可以期待(他們)將缺乏熱忱去站在俄羅斯這一側。
What Putin can do?
1. Start destroying infrastructure (done)
2. Blockade cities (done)
3. Simply level cities with bombers and artillery like in Chechnya or Syria
(may be)
The first two would inflict humanitarian catastrophe and as he hopes break
the will.
普京能做什麼？
1.開始破壞基礎設施（已經開始進行）
2.封鎖城市（已經開始進行）
3. 簡單地用轟炸機和大砲將城市夷為平地，例如車臣或敘利亞（有可能）
前兩個將造成人道主義災難，這會與他原本的期望背道而馳。
Third one is more problematic. Unlike Chechnya or Syria where you could
easily justify the open genocide with “fighting jihadees” which is a fair
play in the “war on terror”, here it would be more difficult and actually
might draw the NATO response. Still, I can’t exclude this.
第三個問題更大。與車臣或敘利亞不同，你可以很容易地用“打擊聖戰者”來證明公開種族滅絕的正當性，這是“反恐戰爭”中的公平遊戲，在這裡它會更加困難，實際上可能會引起北約的反應。不過，我不能排除這個可能性。
So my prognosis is: if the fight continues and victory is not achieved
Russian ability and willingness to fight will be disappearing quickly. Putin
doesn’t have a choice but many of his subordinates do.
所以我的預測是：如果戰鬥繼續下去而沒有取得勝利，俄羅斯的戰鬥能力和意願將迅速消失。普京別無選擇，但他的許多下屬則有。
Even in case when Russia doesn’t technically lose and some source of
armistice/agreement is achieved, Ukraine already won. Why? Many describe this conflict as kinetic. Bullshit. Human conflicts or interactions are not
kinetic. They are mythological and run by myths.
即使俄羅斯在技術上沒有失敗並且達成了停戰/協議的一些來源，烏克蘭也已經贏了。為什麼？許多人將這種衝突描述為動態的。胡扯。人類衝突或互動不是動態的。它們是神話般的，由神話經營。
Money is a myth. It exists only because we believe so. Power is a myth.
Nation is a myth. Institutions are purely mythological. Consider the story of
the burning of Moscow in 1572. Ivan the Terrible divided his country to
Zemschina (land) and Oprichnina (taken apart).
金錢是一個神話。它的存在只是因為我們相信。權力是一個神話。民族是一個神話。制度純粹是神話。想想 1572 年莫斯科大火的故事。伊凡雷帝將他的國家劃分為 Zemschina（職轄區）和 Oprichnina（特轄區）.
譯註：此處感謝下面autoexecbat網友的說明跟建議，為讀者方便理解我摘錄在下面
→ autoexecbat : 伊凡後來創建了特轄區(Oprichnina)與原本的國土 (Zemschina)相對, 特轄區內不受國法拘束. 特轄區軍 (Oprichniks)是伊凡的打手. 那段就講述神話包裝下, 特轄軍可以屠殺東正教徒, 因為沒人會有組織性的抵抗, 但當克里米亞汗國打來時這群人卻戰力大不如前, 因為對手已經不是會相信沙皇天下無敵的東正教徒. 這時連特轄軍才發現自己是人並落荒而逃 莫斯科陷落.
(以下有十段左右的文字在探討神話建構與莫斯科政權建國的關係我就略過)
Theorists of war of the bygone age understood it. Clausewitz pointed out that it’s important not only if you lost independence but *how* you lost it. If you submitted without a fight, you saved lives. But you killed your mythos. You’ll be digested by the conqueror
過去時代的戰爭理論家明白這一點。克勞塞維茨指出，重要的不僅是你是否失去了獨立性，而且*如何*失去它。如果你不戰而降，你就挽救了生命。但是你殺死了你的神話。你會被征服者消化。
But if you lost after the brutal and bloody fight your mythos is alive. The
memory of the last battle will live through the ages. It will shape the
mythological space your descendants live in and they’ll attempt to restore
independence at the first opportunity.
但是，如果您在殘酷而血腥的戰鬥後輸了，您的神話仍然存在。最後一戰的記憶將永存。它將塑造您的後代生活的神話空間，他們將在第一時間嘗試恢復獨立。
(全文完)