—— by PTT
原文網址 https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/16/opinions/afghanistan-collapse-abandonment-jason-amerine/index.html
翻譯文網址 https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/Warfare/M.1629652464.A.0B7.html
背景介紹:
這是美國陸軍退役中校Jason Amerine於8月17號投書CNN的文章。
他是美國陸軍軍官學校1993年班畢業，於2001年擔任駐阿富汗特戰部隊的領導職。
我個人很喜歡他這篇投書。所以大致翻譯成中文。中英對照放在這給大家讀。
小弟翻譯能力可能不好。前面一些背景介紹我也沒有翻譯，我直接從他到阿富汗開始
翻譯。
————————–以下開始———————–
It coincided with a stalemate in Afghanistan’s civil war between Taliban
forces and the warlord armies of the Northern Alliance. Following 9/11,
the US plan was to support those armies in conquering the Taliban and
seizing Kabul. The problem with the strategy was that sending these Northern Alliance forces composed of Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara fighters into the Pashtun tribal belt threatened to prolong the civil war rather than end it.
美國後911的阿富汗戰略是，和北方聯盟合作，把烏茲別克，塔吉克和哈札爾人部隊，送到南方普什圖人的地區。這導致阿富汗內戰得以延長而非結束。
So the warlords of the Northern Alliance seized their tribal lands in the
north while Hamid Karzai, a prominent member of the Pashtun tribe, sought to conquer the Pashtun territory in the south. My Special Forces team, along with a CIA paramilitary team, infiltrated Uruzgan province with Karzai to meet up with just a few dozen tribal fighters. Our unlikely campaign followed the same template we witnessed this week as the Taliban swept the country with lightning speed to topple Kabul.
當時北方聯盟的目標是拿回阿富汗北方的部落土地。同時，一個有影響力的普什圖部落 大老Hamid Karzai也想要控制南方的普什圖地區。我的特戰單位和中央情報局，和幾十 個部落戰士，一起和Hamid Karzai一起滲透進入南方的塔里班/普什圖地區。過去一周 塔里班席捲全阿富汗，閃電般推翻卡布爾政權，和當時我們的滲透任務產生的結果都是 同樣的模式。
From the start of our campaign, Karzai spoke to Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a senior Taliban leader, almost daily. The conversations danced around the topic of surrender as the Northern Alliance quickly seized key cities in the North while Karzai secured the defections of Taliban-aligned tribes in the south
從我們的任務開始，Hamid Karzai幾乎天天跟塔里班資深領袖，Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar對談。他們的對談圍繞在阿富汗北方向北方聯盟投降。同時讓Hamid Karzai 控制從塔里班叛逃過來的南方部落。
Karzai’s narrative was simple: His forces had the military support of the US
but he wanted the Pashtun to surrender peacefully. In the wake of 9/11,
Pakistan was forced to suspend its support to the Taliban so their regime was isolated and crumbling. Baradar sent one of his last, large forces to attack Karzai’s small band of anti-Taliban fighters at Tarin Kowt. When they were routed by American air power, all the major Pashtun tribal leaders began defecting to Karzai’s side or declaring neutrality and ending support to the Taliban. Baradar surrendered Kandahar and Afghanistan itself to Karzai in early December 2001.
Hamid Karzai的論點非常簡單。他有美國的軍事支持，但是他也希望南方的普什圖人和 平投降。因為911事件後，巴基斯坦被迫停止對塔里班的支持。所以當時塔里班政府已經 被孤立並且開始崩壞。Baradar 派出他最後的塔里班大部隊到Tarin Kowt攻擊Karzai的 反塔里班小部隊，結果該部隊被美國空軍攔截後，所有普什圖族的大部落首長，不是轉 投靠Karzai或是宣稱維持中立不再支持塔里班。所以在2001年12月月初，Baradar向 Karzai獻出南部大城坎達哈以及阿富汗。
With the fall of the Taliban, the US and coalition forces demobilized all the
warlords’ armies and established the Afghan National Army in hopes of
empowering Kabul. Afghanistan was to be protected by an ethnically integrated army controlled by the central government. And the Taliban leadership, who fled to Pakistan, regrouped as Pakistan quietly supported this growing threat (Pakistan has long denied supporting the Taliban).
塔里班政府垮台後，美國和北約聯軍解編了所有軍閥/部落軍隊。建立了卡布爾中央政府的 阿富汗國軍。希望這樣可以豎立卡布爾中央的權威(譯者著:強幹弱枝)。阿富汗如此由一個多民族混和的中央政府軍隊保護。同時塔里班領導群逃亡到巴基斯坦。在巴基斯坦安靜 的重新組建起來。
The invasion of Iraq caused the entire US military to be drawn into a bloody
insurgency that pushed the limits of our all-volunteer army to sustain itself. In Afghanistan, the demobilization of the warlord armies created a security vacuum that slowly spawned a Taliban insurgency, supported by Pakistan.
當美國入侵伊拉克時，幾乎整個美軍被拉入血腥的伊拉克反叛亂戰爭。把美國的全志願役陸軍制度逼到了極限。而在阿富汗，由於軍閥軍隊被解編，導致在阿富汗出現真空，讓塔里班德已在巴基斯坦支持下重啟叛亂戰爭。
The Afghan National Army was still in its infancy and the US could not send
forces to respond to this threat as it fought to prevent the collapse of Iraq.
The US could not even sanction Pakistan for supporting the Taliban because
all of the major supply lines supporting US forces went through Pakistan andhad to be maintained through polite diplomacy.
而阿富汗國軍還在草創期，同時因為美軍在防止伊拉克政府的垮台，所以美國不能送兵力去回應塔里班。同時，由於美國所有的運輸補給都經過巴基斯坦，所以美國也不能透過制裁巴基斯坦來阻止巴國支持塔里班。
Years of benign neglect followed in Afghanistan as Kabul and all our Afghan
allies became more and more alienated by America’s lack of action to com batthe Taliban. Kabul’s legitimacy was based on the Loya Jirga, a tribal council that established the government. But the defense of the nation rested on the Afghan National Army that could only stand and fight when supported by coalition partners. And Kabul faced an insurgency supported by Pakistan.
在多年的良性忽視下，美國缺少直接對付塔里班的行動，導致阿富汗中央政府和北約盟國越來越對此感到疏遠。中央政府的合法性取決於部落會議，但是國防仰賴阿富汗國軍，而阿富汗國軍又只能在有北約盟軍的協助下作戰。同時阿富汗中央政府還要面對由巴基斯坦支持的叛亂。
The question was: whose support would endure? America’s support of Kabul or Pakistan’s support to the Taliban? Few believed the US would stay indefinitely and the Afghan National Army needed generations to become a viable fighting force as Afghanistan faced a growing insurgency that had become another civil war.
由此開始，問題變成，是美國對中央政府的支持，還是巴基斯坦對於塔里班的支持，可以長期的撐下去。很少人相信美國會無限期的出現在阿富汗，並且阿富汗國軍需要好幾個世代才能成為一個能打仗的軍隊。同時阿富汗還面對一場成為內戰的叛亂。
For all the criticism of the Afghan National Army’s lack of capability, many
Americans forget our own Civil War. Though the Federal Army fought the
Confederate Army, both armies were composed of locally raised forces like
Joshua Chamberlain’s famed 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment that was made famous for defeating the 15th Alabama Infantry Regiment at Gettysburg. Such forces fought bloody battles across America that eventually led to the standing army we have today with no such regional affiliations. But that took decades.
很多人抱怨說阿富汗國軍沒有戰鬥力。但是批評者忽略了美國本土的南北內戰歷史教訓。南北內戰期間，聯邦軍和邦聯軍都仰賴地方上組建的部隊。例如蓋茲堡會戰當中，擊敗邦聯軍阿拉巴馬15步兵團的緬因州20志願步兵團。遍及於美國的諸多血腥會戰，最終造就了我們今天沒有地方隸屬關係的常備聯邦陸軍。但是這種中央化的常備陸軍花了好幾十年才建立起來。
But in Afghanistan, locally raised and highly cohesive insurgent tribal
forces supported by Pakistan fought a fledgling Afghan National Army that
was simply outmatched without coalition forces fighting at its side.
Afghanistan settled into a stalemate as Kabul retained control of what
territory it could and the Taliban avoided direct confrontations with
coalition forces that it could not defeat. The years ticked on as the US
effort was simply aimed at maintaining this status quo and depended on an
Afghan Army that could not stand without us.
但是在阿富汗戰場，由巴基斯坦支持，地方上組建，並且高度團結的部落叛軍，對上一隻在沒有北約盟軍支持時無法與之對抗的阿富汗國軍。阿富汗進入了一個僵持階段。中央政府控制了能控制的地區，而同時塔里班避免與打不贏的北約盟軍直接對抗。所以多年下來，美國的努力其實只是維持一個現狀，而這個現狀是維持在依賴美國的阿富汗國軍身上。
With the election of President Barack Obama, the US announced a plan to
withdraw from Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan faced a stark choice: believe in Kabul, backed by an incapable Army that would soon have to stand on its own, or accept that the Taliban were likely going to seize control once again with the backing of Pakistan.
當歐巴馬當選美國總統後，美國政府宣布要撤離阿富汗。阿富汗人民面對很殘酷的選擇:
1. 相信由不合格的阿富汗國軍和中央政府，很快就可以在沒有美國支持下存活。
2. 接受在巴基斯坦支持下的塔里班，很快就會控制整個阿富汗。
The Obama administration quickly recognized how precarious the situation was in Afghanistan and indefinitely delayed such a withdrawal. If nothing else, it did not want to be the author of Kabul’s collapse. But the election of
President Donald Trump led to his repeated calls for an immediate withdrawal that established a framework for US departure.
歐巴馬政府很快就意識到狀況有多危險，所以很快就無限期的擱置撤軍。因為歐巴美政府不希望成為中央政府垮台的兇手。但是川普當選美國總統後，他開始多次宣示要立刻撤離阿富汗，這也就建立了美國撤離的基礎平台。
Many believed President Joe Biden would be more cautious once elected. He
witnessed the disastrous fragmentation of Iraq and rise of ISIS when the US
departed precipitously. But he pressed on anyway, executing the withdrawal
of US forces that left the tribes of Afghanistan little choice but
capitulation. The ANA collapsed predictably and there was no longer a
Northern Alliance to rally behind. And so everyone surrendered as quickly
in 2021 as they did in 2001. The circle was complete.
很多人相信拜登總統會更小心。因為他親眼見過當美國撤離伊拉克時，伊拉克發生災難式的分裂以及伊斯蘭國恐怖組織的崛起。但是他還是執行了美軍撤離，讓阿富汗的部落除了投降外別無選擇。阿富汗國軍的垮台預言了不再有北方聯盟。所以每個人都跟在2001年一樣，快速的投降，只是這次投降對象從美國支持的北方聯盟/中央政府變成塔里班。完成了一個循環。
Rumor has it that Karzai again negotiated with Baradar in the final days of
the Afghan government this week: the roles were reversed as Karzai again
sought to limit bloodshed. I do not know if this is true. But the unfolding
humanitarian disaster will be anything but bloodless.
有謠言說，這個星期在阿富汗府的最後幾天，Hamid Karzai又開始跟Baradar談判。只是現在腳色互換，並且Hamid Karzai在一次訴求減少流血。我不知道這是真是假，但是接下來的人道災難絕對不會是不流血。
Our mission in 2001 was to remove the terrorist safe havens of Afghanistan.
It was an act of revenge. I was proud to see it evolve into something more
as little girls went to school and women were allowed to vote. But now the
noblest gains of our mission are lost and we are left to say, “At least we
got Bin Laden.” It just rings so hollow to me.
我們在２００１年的行動是一個復仇行動，任務是把恐怖分子在阿富汗的溫床剷除。
我很驕傲可以看到這個行動變的不只是復仇反恐，例如看到小女孩可以上學，女性可
以投票。但是我們任務的這些高貴的成果化為灰燼，然後我們說”至少我們清除了賓
拉登”。我覺得這太空虛了。
The last text from a man I fought beside at Tarin Kowt reads “Hi, Jason my
dear friend, thank you for your support…Taliban is already here, if I
survive we will contact again. Thank you for everything.”
I will never understand why he thanked me.
我收到最後一個來自我在Tarin Kowt戰友的簡訊這樣說：
我的好朋友傑森，謝謝你的支持，塔里班來了。如果我活下來我們會再聯絡，謝謝你
付出的一切。
我想我永遠都不能明白他到底為什麼要感謝我。